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Taiwan Re-recognized: A Model for Taiwan's
Future Global Status

More than a decade has passed since the United States
officially recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) as
the legitimate government of China. In 1979, American policy
makers concluded that recognizing the PRC was in the United
States' best interest. At that time, the United States saw improving relations with China as an effective means of countering Soviet expansionism. The United States also predicted that
improved relations with Beijing would win access to China's
untapped market of over one billion consumers.
In recognizing the PRC, however, the United States
derecognized its long time faithfiil ally-the Republic of China
on .Taiwan (ROC)-which
also claims to be China's legitimate
government. While derecognition did not materially alter U.S.Taiwan relations, it did spur Taiwan's loss of status within the
global community. Taiwan lost representation in most of the
world's principal international structures, including the World
Bank, International Monetary Fund, and General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Furthermore, with the exception
of several Third World countries dependent upon Taiwan's economic assistance, most countries followed the united States in
breaking off official ties with Taiwan.'
Today, Asia is different than it was when the United
States normalized relations with the PRC. The Soviet Union is
no longer perceived as the region's expansionist nemesis. Moreover, U.S. trade with China has not lived up to expectations,

1. J. COPPER,
TATWAN: NATION-STATE
OR PROVINCE? 112-13 (1990). Prior to
1979, Taiwan had already lost its seat at the United Nations and an increasing
number of countries were shifting ties to Beijing. After the United States recognized Beijing in 1979, that once small stream of abandoning countries and international organizations became a flood. See id. See also Kau, Taiwan and Beuing's
Campaigns for Unifxation, in TAIWANIN A TIME OF TRANSITION 175, 187-90 (H.
Feldman, M. Kau & I. Kim e b . 1988) (listing countries which maintain diplomatic
relations with the ROC and the PRC).
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and hopes for the timely democratization of China were virtually crushed by the tanks at Tienanmen. By contrast, Taiwan,
despite its small size2 and population: has become the United
States' fifth largest trading partner4 and has achieved a per
capita income twenty times that of mainland China.5 In addition, Taiwan has rapidly democratized its political ~ y s t e m . ~
Some things have not changed. The United States continues to seek the peaceful and prosperous democratic development of the Pacific region. In light of the region's new order,
however, the United States should reappraise its policy for
meeting this goal. What role should Taiwan play in building a
peaceful and prosperous democratic Pacific region? Should
Taiwan be isolated, as Beijing advocates, or does Taiwan's model of economic and political development merit an enhanced
status in the international community? If Taiwan is to play a
more prominent role, should the United States officially recognize the ROC? Could Taiwan be recognized without seriously
aggravating U.S.-PRC relations? Does Taiwan even desire official recognition?
Part I1 of this article sets the stage for the discussion of
these issues by summarily recounting the United States' normalization of relations with the PRC and its effect on Taiwan.
Part I11 examines the concept of recognition and whether offi-

2.
Taiwan is a 90 by 120 mile island (approximately 13,968 square miles),
making it roughly the size of Massachusetts and Connecticut combined. H. KWANG,
QUESTIONSAND ANSWERS ABOUT THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 3 (1987). Taiwan is
situated just off the southeastern coast of mainland China. The island is 225 miles
north of the Philippines, 665 miles southwest of Japan, and 90 miles east of the
PRC. Therefore, while the island is small, its central location in the Pacific Rim
has helped it to become an economic hub of the region. See id. See also J. COPPER,
supra note 1, at 1-2.
3.
While Taiwan's population of approximately 20 million people is small compared to the populations of many countries, Taiwan is five times more densely
populated than the PRC, making it one of the most densely populated countries in
the world. See J. COPPER,supra note 1, at 6. Adding to Taiwan's congested living
conditions, most of its people live in coastal urban regions which constitute just onefourth of the island's total area. See id.
4.
Droker & Sander, Market Taiwan, BUSINESS AMERICA,June 19, 1989, vol.
110, no. 12, at 2 (In 1988, U.S. exports to Taiwan reached $9.6 billion (excluding
gold), and imports reached $26 billion.). Taiwan is also the world's twelfth largest
trader, with two-way trade of $108 billion in 1988. Id. See generally, infra note 64
(economic assessment of Taiwan).
5.
J. COPPER,supra note 1, at 92. See generally, infra note 65 (economic assessment of Taiwan).
6. See infia note 66 (political appraisal of Taiwan).
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cia1 recognition of the ROC would be consistent with international legal norms. Part IV discusses the options for Taiwan's
future and the desirability of re-recognition given the current
interests of the ROC, PRC, and United States. Part IV also
proposes a modified version of Beijing's "one country, two governments" model for recognizing both the ROC and the PRC
while theoretically permitting both governments to remain i n
control of China. This model would conceivably increase
Taiwan's international stature and, at the same time, provide a
framework within which either a policy of reunification or independence could be fostered. This article concludes that the ROC
deserves official recognition, that recognition of the ROC is
legally and politically viable, and that recognition is consistent
with the United States' interest in the peaceful and prosperous
democratic development of the Pacific region.
OF U.S.-PRC RELATIONS
AND ITS EFFECT
11. NORMALIZATION
ON U.S.-ROC RELATIONS

A. Normalizing Relations with the PRC;
Derecognizing the ROC
When Chiang Kai-Shek and two million ROC Nationalists were
forced to flee China in 1949, the allegiance of their wartime
ally-the United States-crossed the Taiwan Strait with them.
Strong U.S.-ROC ties, solidified by the Cold War,continued for
thirty years.' However, U.S.-ROC relations began to change in
the Sixties. The United States began t o perceive the potential
strategic and economic benefits of warming relations with the
PRC. While Washington was convinced of the benefits of better
relations with the PRC, it took three U.S. presidents and twenty years to ultimately normalize relations with the PRC? Nor-

7.
The Truman administration was a little skeptical about supporting Taiwan
immediately following World War I1 because it believed that Chiang Kai-Shek was
a corrupt leader who was incapable of success. Its position abruptly changed,
however, when communist North Korea invaded South Korea, and the United
States ended up stationing its Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait. Myers, A
Unique Relationship, in A UNIQUERELATIONSHIP:
THE UNITEDSTATESAND THE
REPUBLIC
OF CHINAUNDERTHE TAIWAN RELATIONS
ACT 1, 1-2 @amon H. Myers
ed., 1989). In addition to military aid, the United States gave Taiwan approximately $1.5 billion in economic aid from 1952 to 1968. Id at 2.
8.
See generally Feldman, Development of U.S.-Taiwan Relations 1948-1987, in
TAIWAN IN A TIMEOF TRANS~ION,
supm note 1, at 137-51 (history of U.S. normal-
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malization9 was initiated by Richard Nixon, fostered by Gerald
Ford, and consummated by Jimmy Carter on January 1, 1979
when the United States established official diplomatic relations
with the PRC.1°
As a condition to recognizing the PRC, the United States
broke off official diplomatic relations and abrogated its security
pact with the ROC." Derecognition seemed unavoidable since
both the PRC and the ROC insisted that they were the legitimate government of China. After derecognition, the ROC was
no longer China to the United States, but simply Taiwan and
its people. Taiwan was not completely surprised by the United
States' action. In fact, it had been slowly adapting to the U.S.PRC detente of the Seventies. Nevertheless, Carter's hasty
decision to break with Taiwan left many in Taiwan bitter.12
At the time the United States broke diplomatic ties with
Taiwan, its Taiwan policy was intentionally ambiguous. Washington surmised that Beijing was so eager to build U.S.-PRC
ties that Washington could deliberately gloss over the issue of
whether Taiwan was part of the PRC." Washington, likewise,
had no intention of letting the Taiwan issue hamper improved
relations with Beijing." The Shanghai Communique, signed
by President Nixon in 1972 acknowledged that the United
States did not challenge the position of "all Chinese on either
side of the Taiwan Strait [that] there is but one China and that
Taiwan is a part of China."ls Nixon did not explicitly state,
izing relations with PRC); Hinton, The Republic of China on Taiwan Since 1949, in
AMERICAAND ISLAND CHINA9, 12-13 (S. Gilbert & W. Carpenter eds., 1989) @rief
overview of normalization).
9.
One noted diplomat defined "normalization", in this context, as "a term
somewhere between euphemism and codeword that all understood to mean the establishment of full diplomatic relations with the PRC." Feldman, supra note 8, at 143.
10. See Id. at 150.
11. See J. COPPER,supra note 1, at 98.
12. The Carter administration gave ROC President Chiang Ching-Kuo six hours
notice before it announced that it would establish diplomatic relations between
Washington and Beijing, to take effect in two weeks. Feldman, supra note 8, at
150-51. See a h THE TAIWANRELATIONS ACT: A DECADEOF ~MPLEMENTATION
6-7
(W. Bader & J. Bergner eds. 1989) [hereinafter DECADEOF IMPLEMENTATION]
(Carter administration's treatment of normalization incensed Congress).
13.
Copper, Democracy on Taiwan Could CMenge United States-China Policy,
H ~ R ~ AFOUND.
GE
REP., July 14, 1987, at 2.
14. Id.
15. President Nixon's Visit to the Peoples Republic of China, 66 U.S. DEFT ST.
Bu. 435, 437-38 (Mar. 20, 1972). See also DECADEOF IMPLEMENTATION,
supra
note 12, at 4 (Amrding to Kissinger, the purpose of this language was "to put off
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however, that Taiwan was part of China. Furthermore, the
1979 Joint Communique establishing diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC recognized "the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China," but i t did not confirm the PRC's legal claim
to Taiwan?

B. The Taiwan Relations Act and the Practical Effect of
Normalized U.S.-PRC Relations on U.S. -ROC Relations
On April 10, 1979, Washington moved to dispel the confusion surrounding U.S.-Taiwan relations and soften the shock
that had resulted from the rupture of diplomatic ties with Taiwan by enacting the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).17 Congress
enacted the TRA to maintain "close and friendly commercial,
cultural, and other relations between the people of the United
States and the people on Taiwan."18
The TRA does not refer to Taiwan as the "Republic of China,"
but as the people of Taiwan, their institutions, and "the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as
the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979."" Relations
between the United States and Taiwan after 1979 were restricted to "unofficial" relations by the Joint Communique and
the TRAFOIn spite of this label, however, the TRA and supplemental agreements have, to some extent, reestablished the
United States' recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign nationstate. For example, except for the use of diplomatic license
plates and diplomatic passports, the United States extends
essentially the same diplomatic privileges to representatives
from Taiwan as it extends to diplomats from officially recog-

the issue of Taiwan for the future, t o enable the two nations to close the gulf of
twenty years and to pursue parallel policies where their interests coincided.").
16. Joint Communique on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the
United States of America and the People's Republic of China, 79 U.S. DEPV ST.
BUU. No. 2022, at 25 (1979). See also Copper, supm note 13, at 2.
17. 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3316 (1988). Raymon Myers claims that the relationship
established by the TRA was unique because "[plerhaps for the first time in the
history of modern foreign affairs, a state had broken relations with another, only
to create a new legal arrangement so as to maintain virtually all the relationships
that had existed before." Myers, supra note 7, at 13.
18. 22 U.S.C. 8 3301(bX1) (1988).
19. Id. # 3301(a)(l).
20.
The TRA, however, describes U.S.-Taiwan relations without using the word
"unofficial". See 22 U.S.C. '$8 3301-3316.
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nized nations.21 The TRA also grants Taiwan access to U.S.
The TRA also counteracts the United States' termination of
its security pact with the ROC by promising military aid. The
TRA declares that "the United States will make available to
Taiwan such defense articles and defense services . . . as may
be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient selfdefense ~apability.'~~
Although the United States has sold
over five billion dollars worth of arms to Taiwan since 1979,"
sales have been sharply curtailed in recent yeamas The TRA
also provides that any nonpeaceful actions against Taiwan,
including boycotts or embargoes, will be considered "a threat to
the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave
concern to the United States."26
The TRA is evidence that the United States has assumed
significant responsibility for maintaining Taiwan's security and
a peaceful environment for fostering Taiwan's economic and
political development? The TRA has successfully cultivated a
relationship of expanded U.S.-ROC trade. Since the TRA's enactment, two-way trade between the United States and the
ROC had increased from nine billion dollars to over thirty-five
billion dollars, making Taiwan the United States' fifth largest
trading partner."
While the TRA has helped foster a peaceful environment
for Taiwan's economic and political development, the T W s
Recent Developments-Intemtwnal Agreements: United States-Taiwan Rela21.
tions, 22 HARV. INT1, L J . 451, 456 (1981).
22.
22 U.S.C. 33030sX7) (1988).
23.
Id. 8 3302(a).
24.
Copper, supra note 13, at 2.
25.
Myers, supm note 7, at 16-18. The Reagan admirrintration refused to sell
Taiwan advanced weapon systems and promised the PRC that the United States
would reduce the quantity of weapons sold to Taiwan. Some claim the agreement
with the PRC' to limit the quantity and quality of weapons sold to Taiwan
breached the TRA provision which states that Congress and the President should
make these decisions based on Taiwan's needs and not on the PRC's wishes.
Feldman, supra note 8, at 153. Nevertheless, Taiwan has taken up the slack by
committing more resources to developing advanced weapons necessary to deter
possible PRC aggression, and the United States has been willing to assist Taiwan
in this development by providing technology, design, and construction services.
Myers, supra note 7, at 18.
3301(bX4) (1988).
26.
22 U.S.C.
27.
See Copper, supra note 13, at 2. For more on Taiwan's economic and political development, see infnt notes 65-66.
28.
See Droker & Sander, supra note 4, at 2.
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unofficial recognition of the ROC has not improved Taiwan's
international status. Taiwan is still denied membership in all
but one major international organization." Official recognition
by the United States could rectify this. The ramifications of
recognizing the ROC will be considered below.

111. 'ERECOGNITION" IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND PRACTICE
"Recognition" is a political expression by the government of
the recognizing country attesting that an entity meets the qualifications of statehood or that a regime meets the qualifications
of a government.30 Recognition of a country by participating
members of the world community is vital to a country's status
and activity within the world community. Under customary
international law, the qualifications for recognition as a nationstate include (1) a defined territory, (2) a government which
has effective control over the territory:' (3) a permanent population, and (4) a capacity to enter into relations with other
nation-states.32
Possession of these qualXications, however, does not guarantee that a country will be recognized as a nation-state. History demonstrates that political considerations predominate the
granting of recognition. Countries ultimately recognize other
countries in order to advance their own national interests, not
merely to express their allegiance to international legal principle~.~~
The world community's failure to recognize the ROC illustrates the sigmficant role political considerations can play in
determining whether to recognize de jure nation-states. The
See Kau, supra note 1, at 189 (the only important international organiza29.
tion that Taiwan belongs to is the Asian Development Bank).
See J . SWEENEY, C . OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGALSYS30.
TEM 894 (3d ed. 1988); B. WESTON,
R. FALK& A. D'AMATO,INTERNATIONALLAW
AND WORLDORDER 280 (1980) (quoting Schwebel, "Cognition" and the Peking
V i s i t I s the Recognition of G6vernnzents Obsolete?, WASHINGTON
POST, Feb. 23,
1972, $ A, at 16, col. 3).
note 30, at 280.
,
B. W E ~ Nsupm
31.
See Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art. 1,
32.
December 26, 1933, 165 LEAGUE
OF NATIONSTREATY SERIES 19 (1933).
supra note 30, at 266-67 (quoting J. STARKE,
AN INTRODUCTION
B. WESTON,
33.
TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW14961 (8th ed. 1977) ("[tlhere is an irresistible tendency in
recognizing States to use legal principles as a convenient camouflage for political
decisions")). One scholar suggests that %cognition decisions . . . be based solely on
whether the new government has control of its state." Peterson, Recognition of
Governments Should Not Be Abolished, 77 AM. J. I W L L. 31, 50 (1983).
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ROC has never ceased to meet the legal criteria for recognition.
In fact, the ROC is in control of a territory and population that
~
is larger than the average contemporary n a t i o n - ~ t a t e .The
ROC government is more stable than the governments of most
nation-states. And while its diplomatic ties are few, its capacity
to enter into relations with other nation-states compares favorably with many Third World countries.35 Nevertheless, as
mentioned before, most countries-including the United States--do not recognize the ROC. In 1979, U.S. policy makers renounced any official recognition of the ROC after determining
that U.S. interests would be better served by stronger ties with
Beijing. Washington felt that strong ties with Beijing could be
used as its "China card" to be played against the Soviet
threat.36 Washington also thought that strong ties with Beijing would best serve its overall economic interests in Asia
since mainland China offered a large, mostly untapped, marketplace for U.S. business. Finally, while recognition of the
PRC necessitated derecognition of the ROC, many in Washington believed that this could be accomplished without sacrificing
U.S. economic or political ties with
The circumstances which led to the United States' decision
to deny the ROC official recognition in 1979 have changed
dramatically in the last twelve years. Today there are much
fewer compelling political considerations for the United States
not to recognize the ROC. The United States is no longer playing its China card to check Soviet expansionism because the
J. COPPER,supra note 1, at 123.
Id
Ironically, it was for basically the same underlying political reasons that
36.
the United States had recognized the ROC while refusing to recognize the PRC for
the thirty years prior to 1979 when the PRC also satisfied the legal criteria for
recognition. During the Fifties, the United States' policy for containing the spread
of communism was to "isolate and contain the PRC's foreign policy through trade
embargo and building alliances in the Pacific Basin. The U.S. State Department
announced in May 1951 that the United States had no intention of recognizing the
PRC and instead would recognize the ROC as having sovereignty over the mainland." Myers, supra note 7, at 11. This policy began to change in the Sixties,
however, when Beijing broke off relations with Moscow and many advocated giving
the PRC a seat at the United Nations. h m that point on, the United States
increased its contacts with the PRC. Id at 12.
37.
While Washington realized the potential economic benefits of ;loser ties
with the PRC, it did not want to give up existing economic benefits with Taiwan.
In 1979 the United States and the ROC'S two-way trade reached $9 billion, U.S.
investments in Taiwan exceeded $6.6 billion, and the two had entered into more
than 60 treaties and agreements. Id at 14.
34.
35.
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Soviet Union has abandoned its expansionist course. Furthermore, U.S. business in the PRC has failed to turn a profit and
has dropped sharply since the events of Tienanmen.

IV. TAIWAN'S
FUTUREGLOBAL
STATUS
A. ROC-PRC Relations and the Future of Taiwan
Since the basis for Taiwan's derecognized status is its
claim as the legitimate government of China, Taiwan's future
is inextricably tied to its relationship with the PRC. The possible legal and political relationships that could develop between
the ROC and the PRC are numerous. However, the most likely
relationships to develop are (1) forced reunification under communist rule, (2) Taiwan independence or maintenance of the
status quo, (3) reunification under the "one country, two systems" formula, or (4) peaceful reunification under democratic
rule. The likelihood and implications of each of these four scenarios is discussed below.
1. Forced reunification under communist rule
Forced reunification by the PRC represents the worst, but
plausible, case scenario for Taiwan and the region. Taiwan has
so much to lose by reunification that it may never voluntarily
agree to reunify, and Beijing, for its part, has maintained that
it "could not pledge never to use force to achieve reunificat i ~ n . "Surely
~ ~ the United States would not accede to Beijing's
forced occupation of Taiwan. But the question is just how far

38. Id. at 21 (quoting Daily Report: China, 'FBIS-CHI-88-107 (June 2, 1988) at
52). Beijing claims that it cannot commit itself to give up the use of force because
First, matters that concern national dignity must not be handled at the
beck and call of a foreign country and any promise that would harm
national dignity must not be made. For matters relating to China's internal &airs, we will not tolerate any foreign country's indiscreet remarks.
Since some foreign countries have always cast greedy eyes on Taiwan, we
must not bind ourselves hand and foot and thus be at a loss what to do
if foreign involvement should occur. Second, the statement is also directed
against the plot for the "independence of Taiwan." The "movement for
independence of Taiwan" is making increasing noise and so we must be
on the alert. Third, the statement is aimed at those Kuomingtang members opposed to reunification. If we promised to relinquish the use of
force, these people would wax cocky and never accept peace negotiations.
Qing, "One Country, Two Systems" The Best Way to Peaceful reunification, 33
BELTING
REV. 18, 25 (Aug. 13, 1990).
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would the United States be willing to go in protecting Taiwan?39The answer to this question depends, of course, upon
who is in the White House and the global situation at the time.
While forced reunification is possible, ''[tlhe Communist
Party of China has long indicated that peacefully r e u n i m g
Still, Beijing's mixed sig[China is] an established poli~y.~'
nals concerning the use of force have made Taiwan wary of the
PRC's peacefid overtures." If Beijing's commitment to a peaceful solution is genuine, then it appears that Taiwan holds the
upper hand in determining its future. This does not mean,
however, that Taiwan will persuade the PRC to r e d y under
ROC Nationalist rule or that Taiwan even wants rellnification.
An increasingly vocal number of Taiwanese today have little
desire to become part of the mainland, especially after the
events of Tienanrnen.42
2. Taiwan independence or maintaining the status quo

Taiwan's territory and the make-up of its population has
remained unchanged for four decades. It is likely to remain the
same in the hture. The majority of Taiwan's citizens are satisfied with the status quo. However, some local citizens and
39.

One noted China scholar maintains that
If an invasion of Taiwan were to become imminent, the United States
might order the return of US. naval forces to the Taiwan Strait. Such an
action could be justified by several lines of reasoning: that lives would be
saved, that it would protect Japan's oil lifeline as well as other international commerce in the area, and that it would prevent the Soviet Union
from exploiting the situation.
J. COPPER,supm note 1, at 122.
40.
Qing, supra note 38, at 20.
41.
While Beijing's ultimate goal of unification has been consistent, how it will
reach this goal has alternated between "armed liberation" and "peaceful unification." This phenomenon, as described by one commentator, gives Taipei little
assurance of Beijing's intentions:
The use of militant threats or peace overtures has correlated closely
with the radical or moderate political moods of the nation. During the
militant periods of the "Resist America and Aid Korea" Campaigns (19501053), the Great Leap Forward Movement (1958-1961), and the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1971), the policy of armed liberation
prevailed. Conversely, in the moderate phases of the Bandung spirit
(1954-1955), the Hundred Flowers Campaign (1955-1956), and the Four
Modernization Movement (1978-), Beijing s W d to an accommodating
posture of peace overtures.
Kau, supra note 1, at 182.
42.
See id. at 178.
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overseas Taiwanese organizations advocate independence because, while satisfied with Taiwan's economic and political
success, they believe that independence would bring official
recognition to Taiwan and increase its stature in the international community. Taiwan's citizens are gaining a stronger
political voice as Taiwan becomes more democratic. This could
ultimately frustrate reunification. If Taiwan were successful in
democratically moving toward independence, official recognition
of Taiwan as a nation-state would take on new meaning for the
United States.
Taiwan's path to independence, however, is strewn with
many obstacles. First, a majority of Taiwan's leaders and population agree that declaring independence a t this time would
only provoke the PRC and aggravate Taiwan's diplomatic isolat i o d 3 Second, cultural and historical arguments exist for not
perpetuating Taiwan's separation from the mainland. Those
who fled to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-Shek in 1949, as well as
the native Taiwanese? are culturally and ethnically Chinese.
In addition, although throughout history China and Taiwan
have often been separated, they have always re~nified.4~
Third, the ROC government is outspoken in its support for
reunification. As recently as October 1990, ROC President Lee
Teng-hui declared that Taiwan and China must reunify and
that all ROC citizens should work together to realize reunification? Taiwan's business community is also pushing for reunification as commercial relations with the mainland improve.
In short, Taiwan's current economic prosperity coupled with its
relationship with the PRC and the United States make independence 'munlikely course for the near f'uture. What then are
the prospects for peaceful reunification?

3. Reunifiation under the PRC's "one country, two systems"
formula
The ROC and the PRC each have their own plans for
43. J. COPPER,supra note 1, at 115.
44.
This does not include Taiwan's aborigines which make up 1.5% of Taiwan's
population. See id. at 8.
45. Id.
46.
Central News Agency, October 24, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt &
Intl files) ('"All Chinese believe that China should be unified. The question is how.'
ROC citizens must shoulder their tnshirkable historic responsibility' of reunifying
China.").
'
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peaceful reun3ication. In recent years, the PRC has encouraged
the opening of dialogue with ROC leaders and has proposed a
"one country, two systems" formula for reunifkation. The PRC's
"one country, two systems" formula proposes that the ROC
concurrently unify with the PRC while retaining its current
lifestyle and economic system and enjoying a high degree of
autonomy."
While the "one country, two systems" formula was Beijing's
most significant peaceful overture to Taiwan, it was not its
fmt. Beijing began making peaceful overtures as early as 1979
when it proposed that Taiwan and the mainland exchange
postal services, trade, and tourism, as well as begin academic,
cultural, scientific, and sports contacts." In 1981, the PRC
proposed a nine-point plan for negotiations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Taiwan's Nationalist Party.
The nine-point plan offered Taiwan a high degree of autonomy,
including the maintenance of its own armed forces, if it surrendered its sovereignty and independen~e.~'Finally, after
Beijing concluded the Sino-Britain agreement in 1984, it attempted to entice Taipei into accepting its Hong Kong plan of
"one country, two systems" by offering even more favorable
terms. For example, while the Hong Kong plan gives Hong
Kong only fifty years of autonomy, Beijing offered to give Taiwan an unspecified longer autonomous period.50
Taiwan's reaction to these proposals has been negative.
This is so because the proposals would not give Taiwan anything it does not already have. The proposals would merely
further isolate Taiwan by taking away its sovereignty. Moreover, it will be virtually impossible for the PRC to persuade
Taiwan to accept the "one country, two systems" formula. Even
if the formula works for Hong Kong, it might not work for Taiwan. One commentator noted that "[ulnlike Taiwan, Hong
Kong has never been sovereign; is not now self-governing; is
not economically viable; and, most important, it cannot defend
itself because it has no armed forces. Over time the differences
between Hong Kong and Taiwan are likely to become more

47.
M. LASATER,
POLICYIN EVOLUTION:
THE U.S. ROLE IN CHINA'SR~TNIPICATION 106 (1989).
48.
Kau, supra note 1, at 182.
49.
50.

Id. at 182-83.
Id. at 183.
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widely appreciatedem51
In short, the "one country, two systems"
formula, as currently proposed by Beijing, is not acceptable to
Taiwan.
4. Peacefil reunifiation under democratic rule

Peaceful reunification under democratic rule is more likely
to occur than peaceful reunification under communist rule for
the simple reason that Taiwan would not voluntarily unify with
the PRC under communist rule. President Chiang Ching-Kuo
made it clear when the United States normalized relations
with the PRC that the ROC would never compromise with
communism," and the people have echoed his sentiment.
Public opinion polls show that over ninety-nine percent of
Taiwan's populace is opposed to living under communist
rule.53
Unfortunately, peaceful reunification under democratic
rule also has its problems. For example, the likelihood of peaceful democratic reunification will probably diminish as economic,
societal, and political gaps between Taiwan and China widen.
Nevertheless, peaceful reunification under democratic rule is
still the most talked about relationship and the articulated goal
of many from the ROC, the United States, and even the PRC.
Assuming that peaceful reunification under democratic
rule is the goal, the ROC can facilitate such reunification by
influencing change on the mainland. Taiwan must become
China's model for economic and democratic development
through increased trade, cultural exchanges, and other meaningful contacts. To this end, Taiwan is in fact increasing its
contacts with the mainland. In 1989, nearly 10,000 tourists a
month from Taiwan visited China, and over 3.4 million pieces
of mail crossed the strait." ROC trade and investments on

51.
J. COPPER,supm note 1, at 124.
52.
See Kau, supra note 1, a t 177-78 (citing an Address by Chiang Ching-Kuo
on Dec. 16, 1978, News from China, (Chinese Information Service, N.Y.),Dec. 29,
1978). Taiwan's opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has also
declared that "[tlhe future of Taiwan should be determined only by the people on
Taiwan through free, democratic and fair process. No government or combined
forces of governments have the right to decide the ultimate political status of Taiwan." Id (quoting Plagorm of the DPP adopted Nov. 10, 1986, 66 LIANHE YUEKAN
[UNITED
MONTHLY]
48 (1987)).
53.
Copper, supra note 14, a t 3.
54.
J. COPPER,supm note 1, at 109.
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the mainland have also flourished. Trade between Taiwan and
the mainland neared four billion dollars in 1 9 9 0 . ~Increased
~
contacts between Taiwan and China are propelled by the potential economic benefits of increased business contacts, the common heritage of Taiwan and China's people, incentives from
Beijing, and the possibility that Taiwan's wealth could help
change the PRC's socialist system.
As an increasing number of PRC citizens witness the prosperity of visitors from Taiwan, there is a greater likelihood that
they will demand change." This could eventually force Beijing
to make far-reaching, radical reforms, thus helping the move
toward reunifi~ation.~'On the other hand, increased contacts
might also have the opposite effect. As an increasing number of
visitors from Taiwan discover China's backwardness, overcrowding, and corruption, there is a greater likelihood that they
will not support reunifi~ation.~'Nevertheless, if reunification
under democratic rule is the goal, Taiwan must convince the
PRC that Taiwan's system is s~perior.~'
In summary, Taiwan's future status vis-a-vis the PRC is
uncertain. Absent major policy changes by the PRC and ROC,
Taiwan will likely remain part of a divided nation. And, while
this relationship with the PRC persists, the global community
will likely continue to treat Taiwan as a unique political entity,
extending it the rights of a nation-state in some instances while
withholding these rights in others. Although the ROC'S future
status vis-a-visthe PRC is uncertain, its superior economic and
democratic development vis-a-vis the PRC is apparent. Taiwan's
economic clout appears to be forcing the issue of Taiwan's
recognition by the global community. Taiwan is playing a larger
role in the international arena, and with additional official
See From Three Noes to Three Guns, E c o ~ o m s r ,Feb. 9, 1991, at 42. See
T d k , January FREE CHINAREV. 6, 9 (1990).
56.
For a detailed description of Taiwan's economic and political miracles and
their effect on the PRC, see the economic and political appraisals infra notes 6566.
57.
Myers, supm note 7, at 20.
58.
For a comparison of the economic conditions of the PRC and the ROC, see
the economic appraisal at infh note 64.
59.
Even as early as one year after Chiang Kai-Shek retreated to Taiwan in
1949, he told his son, Chiang Ching-Kuo, that they would have to reform the
Nationalist party and "transform Taiwan into a model province to serve as a base
for the eventual recovery of mainland China from Communist rule." Myers, supra
note 7, at 1. Most have ruled out any plan of Taiwan taking back China by force.
Id.
55.

also Lo, Strait

recognition from nation-states and international organizations,
Taiwan has the capacity to play a much larger role.
The remainder of this article analyzes Taiwan's future and
proposes a model for enhancing its global status in accordance
with Asia's changing political and economic order. Section B
discusses Taiwan's future, giving particular attention to its
relationship with the United States. Section C then proposes a
model for enhancing Taiwan's status by officially recognizing it,
while at the same time, providing a framework within which
goals of reunification or independence could be advanced.

B. The Future Status of US.-TaiwanRelations
Because Taiwan's growth and security rely so heavily on its
relationship with the United States, the United States' Taiwan
policy must be considered in any assessment of Taiwan's fut ~ r e . ~In
' the past, U.S.-Taiwan relations have acted as a
barometer for measuring the United States' perception of conditions in the region. Since conditions have changed dramatically
over the past decade, the United States should adjust its
relations with Taiwan to conform with these developments.
The impetus for normalization of U.S.-PRC relations that
existed a t the height of the Cold War no longer exists. During
the Eighties, the Soviet threat diminished while the United
States developed new military and political capabilities for
The failing Soviet economy coupled
dealing with the So~iets.~'
with glasnost have led to agreements to cut back the Soviet
Union's military arsenal and have reduced US.-Soviet tensions.
The Soviet Union is also attempting to implement elements of
market economics and to increase cooperation with the West.
The PRC is also experiencing severe domestic problems, both
economically and politically. Its economy is floundering, inflation
is escalating, and Beding is losing touch with its people. After
normalization, Americans befriended China in anticipation of
China's democratization. The prospect of a democratic China has
now, however, been virtually crushed by the tanks a t
Tienanmen. As a result of the economic, strategic, and political
changes in the Pacifk region in the Eighties, the PRC's political
leverage over the United States has declined, while Japan,

60.
61.

See J. COPPER,supra note 1, at 120.
Myers, supra note 7, at 16.
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Taiwan, and other Pacific Rim countries are becoming more
important to the United States.62
While the economic, strategic and political landscape of Asia
is changing, U.S.interests in a peaceful and prosperous Pacific
Rim remain the same. The United States carries on a prosperous
and significant trade with Taiwan, and U.S. businesses have
invested billions of dollars in Taiwan's flourishing economy.63
Taiwan is also strategically located and has offered to give the
United States military basing rights should the Philippines
revoke those rights.B4Finally, the ROC'S successful economic
modernizationB5and rapid democratizatione6 offer a powerful

62.
Id.
63.
Id. at 20.
64.
Id.
65.
The following is a brief appraisal of Taiwan's economic success:
Taiwan's rapid economic growth is the envy of Asia. Like Japan, Taiwan took an
underdeveloped island with few natural resources and, with the efforts of its
industrious people, performed an economic miracle. Shortly &r their arrival in
1949, ROC authorities implemented a series of economic and social policy reforms,
including land reform, which are credited with laying the foundation of Taiwan's
future economic growth and stability. Taiwan also benefitted from U.S. aid programs
and from substantial foreign (US., Japanese, and overseas Chinese) investment in
Labor-intensive, export-oriented industries. Droker & Sander, supra, note 4, at 2.
Taiwan's economy grew at an average annual rate of 9.2% between 1963 and
1985. Real GNP growth, which was more than 11% in 1986 and 1987, slowed to
7.1% in 1988 and 6.5% in the Grst quarter of 1989. INTSL RtADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T
TRENDSAND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
COM.,FOREIGN
ECONOMIC
FOR THE U.S.: TAIWAN
3 (May 1990) [hereinafter ECONOMIC
TRENDS]. Per capita GNP exceeded $6,000 in
1988--up 20% from 1987, the fourth highest in Asia and twenty times higher than
the $300 per capita income of the PRC. J. COPPER,supra note 1, at 92. Unemployment is about two percent. Labor shortages are appearing in some sectors, such as
construction. Investment is moving out of Taiwan to lower Laborcost areas such as
Southeast Asia, Latin America, and even mainland China.
Frugality, a traditional Chinese virtue, coupled with past government incentives
to save has given Taiwan one of the highest private savings ratios in the world.
More than 30% of the GNP for almost every year since 1972 was saved. This
statistic is changing, however, with increased pressure from US. to buy American
and encouragement from Taiwan authorities to spend more. Foreign exchange
reserves stood at $71 billion at the end of 1988, the second highest in the world
after Japan. Inflation was less than 1.5% in 1987 but was heading for a 3-4% rate
in 1989. ECONOMIC
TRENDS,supra, at 3.
Historically, Taiwan's economic growth has relied on exports. Between 1952 and
1988, its exports increased from $120 million to $61 billion, or 19% annually. Droker
& Sander, supra note 4, at 2. Because of exchange rate appreciation, growing
domestic demand, and trade liberalization measures, import growth is now
outstripping the increase in exports. Imports, at $47 billion in 1988, were up 34%
from 1987, compared to a 13% growth rate for exports. Id. Taiwan is attempting to
sustain economic growth primarily by upgrading and diversifying its economy.
Taiwan's attempts t o change have already begun to affect the U.S. Taiwan is opening
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challenge to mainland China to fundamentally reform its communist system. Because the ROC is increasingly becoming
economically, strategically, and politically vital to the United
its customs doors to U.S. products and its banking doors for US-bound investment.
Consequently, internal domestic demand rose nearly 18% in 1988, while external
demand, as measured by the trade surplus, shrank twenty-six percent. The share of
the services sector for the first time exceeded the share of industry in the economy.
ECONOMIC
TRENDS, supm note 4, at 3. Within the industrial seator itself, the share
of heavy and high-technology industry in total industrial production rose from
approximately 57% to 60% last year--at the expense of light industry's share, which
declined from 43 to 40 percent. Id.
66.
The following is a brief appraisal of Taiwan's democratization:
Momentous political changes have occurred in Taiwan in the last three years.
These changes are milestones in the development of democracy in Taiwan. Arguably,
the most significant change was the late Chiang Ching-kuo's order that lifted the 38year-old martial law on July 14, 1987. The purpose of this move, as reported by
government spokesman Yu-ming Shaw, was "to accelerate the promotion of
constitutional democracy, to fully realize the spirit of the constitution, to make
government and society more open, and to improve the people's well-being." Shaw,
Emergency Decree Lifted, 38 FREECHINAREVIEW6 (October 1987). Taiwan abrogated
martial law in order to "(1)reduce military control and expand the power of civil
administration and judicial authority." Id. at 7. For example, civilians will no longer
be tried in military courts. In addition they sought t o "(2) increase civil rights." Id.
For example, the rights of the people to form political parties and to demonstrate
is now protected by law. Id. Taiwan also hoped to "(3) insure that administrative
authorities adhere to the law. Prior to the lifting of martial law, the administrative
scope of some government authorities were vague and open to interpretation." Id.
Taiwan's increasingly healthy political atmosphere, despite recent instability
across the Strait, is reflected in its people's confidence in Taiwan's future. Taiwan
authorities realize that domestic confidence and stability is crucial to future growth.
Even before the late President Chiang lifted martial law, opposition parties had
been organized. The most popular opposition party, the "Democratic Progressive
Party" (DPP) was established on September 28, 1986. Jiang, Celebrations and
Challenges, 38 FREE CHINAREVIEW 5 (October 1987). Even before the DPP was
officially recognized by law, DPP candidates were allowed to compete with the
Nationalists for seats in the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly in the
December elections of that same year. Tsai, lYansformations in the Body Politic, 38
FREE CHJNAREVIE\N,14 (October 1987). The DPP was successful in obtaiding almost
one-third of the popular vote. The success of a second party shocked many China
watchers. One commentator noted that this was "the i h t time in Chinese history
that a truly functional opposition party, even though still technically illegal, was able
to challenge the existing authority in an election on an equal footing." Id. at 15.
The DPP today is a viable party capable of challenging the Nationalists on every
front. Taiwan citizens hope that the recent radical political democratization will
continue and that "future generations will view these times as the beginning of a
new chapter in Chinese political history." Id.
In addition to the lifting of Martial Law in 1987, the new chapter in Chinese
political history will invariably include the lifting of restrictions on visits to the
mainland, the lifting of restrictions on newspaper size and competition, and some
hundreds of demonstrations that, unlike Korea's experience, have been mostly ignored
by the police force. See Andrews, Bansition on Trial, ECONOMIST,
March 5, 1988, at
16.
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States, the United States should work to improve the current
international political status of the ROC.
Under Asia's current economic and political order, it is
unlikely that the United States would have derecognized the
ROC, since relations with the PRC would not have been so
crucial. Taiwan will likely continue to prosper economically
under its current close, but unofficial, relationship with the
United States. Taiwan's own prosperity, however, will not
necessarily foster prosperity throughout the region unless it is
permitted to actively participate in the international arena. In
light of the increasingly irrelevant political considerations which
led to its derecognition, the ROC should no longer be denied
membership in important international organizations-especially
financial organizations such as GATT,the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank-nor should it be hindered fkom
conducting normal foreign relations with other nation-states.

C. A Model for Recognizing the ROC
One method for recognizing the ROC, without derecognizing
the PRC, is a modified version of Beijing's "one country, two systems" formula discussed above?' Under this model, not only
would there be one country and two systems, there would also be
two legitimate governments. Both the PRC and the ROC would
be officially recognized as governments of China and would be afforded all the rights of recognition. The ROC would continue to
govern Taiwan, and the PRC would continue to govern the mainland. The proposed model is notably different from the PRC's
"one country, two systems" formula because in addition to
permitting the ROC to continue governing Taiwan after reunification, it would permit the ROC to share claim to the
government of China.
1. International legal precedent for the modified "one country,
two systems" model
Although international law has not yet developed sufficient
rules for dealing with the recognition of two legitimate governments of one country, there is some precedent for doing so. The
most recent and conspicuous examples of the recognition of two
legitimate governments of one country are Korea and, until
67.

See supra text accompanying notes 47-51.
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recently, Germany. One scholar identifies countries with more
than one recognized government as "multi-system nations."'
They might be better characterized, however, as "dual-system nations" since, while having more than two systems operating in
one country is conceivable, our examples involve only two
systems. Dual-system nations appear to share a t least three
unique characteristics: (1) both systems once belonged t o a
unified country and, while divided now, both expressly maintain
the goal of reunification; (2) both systems claim to be the
legitimate government of their country; and (3) both systems
meet all of the legal qualifications for recognition as an independent state, but do not openly advocate independen~e.~'The
PRC-ROC relationship also possesses these characteristics.
Recognition of both governments of a dual-system nation
would avoid the difficulty that many countries have when faced
with the choice of recognizing one nation-state a t the expense of
another. Recognizing each system would not affect any genuine
goals of reunification, nor would it affect the ROC or PRC's
domestic policies. The ROC and the PRC could both claim t o be
the legitimate government of China, and domestically act as
though they were, while other nation-states would be free to
enter into diplomatic relations with both.
The Germany experience suggests that such a system might
be conducive to reunification. Under Germany's former dualsystem government, the Federal Republic of Germany (F'DR) and
German Democratic Republic (GDR) were able to develop closer
ties and work out their differences. Both the GDR and the FDR
have been members of the United Nations since 1973. The day
after both were admitted to the United Nations, the foreign
ministers of each side, speaking before the General Assembly, renounced, on behalf of their countries, the use of force in solving
In 1973, the two sides also entered into an
their differen~es.~~
agreement to work toward peaceful reunification. In 1974, the
two opened formal relations with each other.71 All of these
exchanges helped lead to the eventual reunification of the two
Germanies. The Korea situation, while still too early to substan-

68.
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69.
70.
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Chiu, The International Law ofRecognition and Multi-System Nations, 1 CHI-

Y.B.INTI L. & AFF. 1, 6 (1981).
See Id.
Id. at 9.
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tiate, could very well be following a similar tract toward reunification.
2. China and the modified "one country, two systems' model

Unless Beijing becomes convinced that a "one country, two
systems" model would foster reunification, it is doubtful that
Beijing would accept it. Beijing could indeed argue .that this
modified model would not foster reunification because, while it
attests to one China, it grants Taiwan more sovereignty, further
separating Taiwan from the mainland. However, the dual-system
nation or modified "one China, two systems" model could stabilize the Taiwan situation within the context of the goal of
reunification. By tolerating an internationally recognized
Taiwan, the PRC could foster increased communication and
closer ties with the ROC. This balanced relationship is crucial to
If reunification is to be realized, the relaChina's re-cation.
tionship between the ROC and PRC must be one of equality, not
subordination.
F i n d y , as the popular movement for Taiwan's independence
intensifies, the model would likely become more favorable to
Beijing because, under the model, Taiwan would not be allowed
t o claim independence. In other words, giving Taiwan limited
sovereignty would probably be preferable to the PRC to giving
Taiwan absolute sovereignty.
3. Taiwan and the modifed "one country, two systems' model

The modified "one country, two systems" model is most
attractive to Taiwan because it would give Taiwan more than it
currently has. The model would allow Taiwan to be officially
recognized by other nation-states, enhancing Taiwan's global
status and making it a more active participant in global affairs.
In spite of enhancing Taiwan's status, the model would perpetuate the claim that Taiwan is inextricably part of China-a claim
that independence advocates oppose. Nevertheless, while perpetuating this claim, the model does not force reunification. Taiwan
would still control its own hture. One might even argue that
Taiwan would gain even more control over its h t u r e under the
model because, as Taiwan's international status increases,
Beijing's threat of forced.reunification would weaken. Thus, the
proposed model could create a framework in which Taiwan might
foster either reunification or independence, depending on the will
of the people.
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Taiwan's economic and political progress, coupled with the
changing order of the Pacific region, necessitates a more active
role for it in world affairs. Granting Taiwan increased international rights and allowing it to participate in world organizations
would improve the peace and prosperity of the region. It would
also foster change in the PRC and affirm Washington's support
for democracy, a free market economy, human rights, and loyalty
to its allies.
The ROC'S global status could be enhanced by official recognition under a modified version of Beijing's "one country, two
systems" formula. This model could increase the ROCs global
stature while providing a framework within which popular goals
of reunification or independence could be advanced.
Michael E. Mangelson

